

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010046-4

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010046-4

**Confidential**



# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

**Confidential**


22 DECEMBER 1971  
(VOL. XXII, NO. 51)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

**W A R N I N G**

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.



**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 DECEMBER 1971

## CONTENTS

Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . .	1
---	---

### INDOCHINA

DRV Foreign Ministry Scores Intrusions, Attacks Against North . .	1
Hanoi and Pathet Lao Acclaim "Victories" on Plain of Jars . . . .	5
Souphanouvong Decries U.S. Operations, Demands Bombing Halt . . .	6
DRV, PRG Continue to Score U.S. Suspension of Paris Talks . . . .	7
Hanoi Observes Army Day and Resistance Day, Urges Enlistments . .	9
Meetings in South and North Vietnam Mark NFLSV Anniversary . . . .	12
Peking Observes NFLSV Anniversary in Low Key . . . . .	14
Moscow Gives Front Anniversary Moderate Attention . . . . .	15

### INDIA-PAKISTAN

Peking Warns Against Expanded Conflict in Western Sector . . . .	17
Moscow Welcomes Moves Toward Settlement of Conflict . . . . .	21

### CHINA

Press Indicates Further Changes on Cultural Front . . . . .	24
Propagandists Reassert Party's Leadership Over All Organs . . . .	25

### PRC-JAPAN

Non-Negotiable Political Issues Divide Peking and Tokyo . . . . .	30
---	----

### YUGOSLAVIA

Tito Invokes Foreign Threat to Defend Moves Against Croats . . .	31
--	----

### FRG-CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Prague Further Softens Public Stance on Munich Issue . . . . .	34
--	----

### SALT

First Soviet Article on Current Round Rehashes Stock Themes . . .	36
---	----

### USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Estonian Questions Brezhnev's Livestock Complex Program . . . . .	37
---	----

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBIS TRENDS  
22 DECEMBER 1971

- 1 -

## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 13 - 19 DECEMBER 1971

Moscow (2878 items)

India-Pakistan Conflict	(12%)	15%
[USSR Foreign Ministry Statement	(--)	5%]
Mars 2 & 3 Probes	(7%)	11%
Indochina	(2%)	7%
[Solidarity Week, NFLSV Anniversary	(--)	5%]
Polish Party Congress	(16%)	6%
China	(9%)*	5%*
European Security	(3%)	3%

Peking (1478 items)

India-Pakistan Conflict	(60%)	37%
Domestic Issues	(14%)	22%
Indochina	(7%)	12%
[DRV Fatherland Front Congress	(--)	4%]
PRC-Iceland Diplomatic Relations	(--)	4%
Cambodian Delegation in DPRK	(1%)	4%
Sudanese Government Delegation in PRC	(--)	3%
UN Disarmament Debate	(0.1%)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

---

\* The China figure excludes commentaries on China's role in the Indo-Pakistani conflict. These commentaries are counted in the figure on India-Pakistan and amount to roughly one-third of the total on the conflict last week and one-fourth this week.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

22 DECEMBER 1971

- 1 -

## INDOCHINA

Hanoi promptly assailed U.S. air intrusions over North Vietnam on 18 December in a statement issued that day by the DRV Foreign Ministry rather than by the ministry spokesman who normally protests routine air actions. The fifth protest against U.S. air action in the DRV to be issued at this high level during the Nixon Administration, it differs from the four previous ones in that all of them were prompted by unusually heavy or concentrated air strikes. It is conceivable that this protest was issued at the more authoritative level because of the location of some of the incursions. In reporting the 20 December press conference at which four U.S. pilots were put on display, Hanoi quoted a spokesman as saying their capture proved that U.S. operations on the 18th had penetrated "deep into" North Vietnam.

Hanoi, of course, ignores U.S. statements that the air action in fact took place over Laos. But notably, in three of the four incidents on the 18th, U.S. planes were charged only with "encroaching" on the DRV's air space rather than with attacking its territory. There is no direct confirmation from Hanoi of the statement by the U.S. Command in Saigon on the involvement of MIG's during the weekend. Hanoi generally credits the downing of U.S. planes over the DRV on the 18th to the "armed forces and people," although an article in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 19th atypically hailed the DRV "antiaircraft and air force" for collaborating with local forces.

The communist offensive in the Plain of Jars on 18-19 December is hailed in Hanoi and Pathet Lao propaganda as "punishment" for encroachments by allied forces into "liberated areas." In two days of attack, the Pathet Lao forces are said to have wiped out nearly 1,000 "puppet" troops and to have downed seven U.S. planes which were supporting the allied forces.

The DRV Foreign Ministry statement and other propaganda on the air incursions uniformly link these "extremely serious acts of war" with U.S. "intensification" of the war throughout Indochina and with the U.S. "scheme to sabotage" the Paris talks. Both the DRV and the PRG spokesmen in Paris issued statements protesting the further U.S. postponement of the 139th session until 30 December, but comment is confined to Front media.

## DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY SCORES INTRUSIONS, ATTACKS AGAINST NORTH

The foreign ministry statement of the 18th, "vehemently" condemning the U.S. "extremely serious war acts," was broadcast some three

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 DECEMBER 1971

- 2 -

hours after Hanoi radio first claimed that three U.S. planes had been downed that day out of "many" sent "to encroach on the skies of Thanh Hoa and Hoa Binh" provinces and "to attack a populated area in Nghe An." The statement's characterization of the U.S. action stops short of that in the most recent previous foreign ministry statement, issued 22 September, which called the massive air strikes the day before "extremely grave and criminal acts of war."\*

Like earlier statements, the current one says the U.S. acts represent "a very insolent challenge to the peace- and justice-loving public in the world, including the American public," and it again accuses the United States of violating its pledge to stop the bombing of the North. But while the statement says the action accords with a U.S. policy of sabotaging the Paris talks, it does not repeat the warning in the other statements that air provocations against the North threaten the work of the Paris talks.\*\*

After the foreign ministry statement had been carried by both Hanoi radio and VNA, a VNA news item repeated the claim that three F-4s had been downed, one each in the provinces of Hoa Binh, Thanh Hoa, and Nghe An, and added the new information that another F-4 had been downed earlier, on the night of the 17th in Quang Binh Province. The report did not specify whether this plane had merely intruded or whether it had attacked. Yet another VNA item on the 19th provided further details of the 18 December action, saying that the total number of aircraft brought down that day came to four with the downing at night of a plane that "encroached upon" the airspace of Vinh Phu Province.

---

\* The TRENDS of 22 September 1971, page four, lists previous foreign ministry statements during the Nixon Administration. In reverse chronological order, they were issued on 22 September 1971, 22 March 1971, 21 November 1970 and 2 May 1970.

\*\* Following each of the four previous foreign ministry protests, the Vietnamese communists boycotted the Paris session. The DRV Foreign Ministry may have failed to issue a warning this time because the United States has already asked that two sessions be suspended, and the communists may be uncertain about the future U.S. attitude.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

22 DECEMBER 1971

- 3 -

CAPTURED        The first monitored Hanoi reference to the capture  
PILOTS           of four U.S. pilots on the 18th came in a domestic  
                 service account on the 20th which reported that  
                 the airmen had been presented to newsmen that day at a press  
                 conference conducted by Ngo Dien, chief of the Information and  
                 Press Department of the DRV Foreign Ministry.\* The broadcast  
                 said they were captured "in Tan Lac district, Hoa Binh  
                 Province"--thus squaring with Hanoi's report that a plane had  
                 been downed in that province--and "in Hoanh Bo district, Quang  
                 Ninh Province." The initial reports of the action had said  
                 nothing about Quang Ninh Province, saying that the four planes  
                 on the 18th had been downed, respectively, in Hoa Binh, Thanh  
                 Hoa, Nghe An, and Vinh Phu provinces. But a congratulatory  
                 message from the VPA High Command, broadcast by Hanoi radio  
                 on the 20th, said that "the U.S. imperialists sent a large  
                 number of war planes to deeply encroach upon DRV air space  
                 in the provinces of Vinh Phu, Hoa Binh, Thanh Hoa and Quang  
                 Ninh and to shell and attack a populous area of Nghe An  
                 Province."\*\*

In addition to recounting the action on the 18th, spokesman  
Dien said he wanted to draw attention to the fact that the  
United States for months has repeatedly sent planes "to commit  
crimes in Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and in  
Vinh Linh area and prepared new military adventures against the  
DRV." He asserted that the capture of the pilots proved that  
the operations on the 18th had penetrated "deep into the mainland  
of North Vietnam," and he reportedly pointed out the locations  
on a map. Echoing the foreign ministry statement, he observed  
that these "new war acts" took place after President Nixon and  
Secretary Laird had "announced their intention to step up the  
war," while Vietnamization is going on and "in concert with the  
arrogant tricks of the U.S. representative at Paris" aimed at  
"sabotaging" the talks.

The spokesman called the press conference "stern evidence  
exposing Nixon's lie that the Americans are ending the war and  
hoping to solve the Vietnam war peacefully." Following Dien's

---

\* There was a precedent on 6 May 1967, when three pilots were  
displayed by the command of the Hanoi armed forces at a press  
conference the day after their plane was downed.

\*\* This is the first such VPA message since one following the  
intensive U.S. air strikes on 21-22 March 1971.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

22 DECEMBER 1971

- 4 -

statement, newsmen reportedly photographed the four pilots. And on the 21st VNA's radiophoto service in English to Southeast Asia transmitted photographs--identifying them, as in the earlier broadcast, as First Lt. Kenneth Ralph Wells and Major Leiland Louis Hildebrand, captured in Hoa Binh Province, and First Lt. Samuel Richard Vaughan and Major Kenneth Richard Johnson, captured in Quang Ninh Province.

At the press conference, the spokesman said that despite President Nixon's "hallyhoo" about seeking all means to bring the POW's home, he is in fact preparing "new military adventures" against the DRV which will lengthen the list of prisoners.\* A Hanoi broadcast in English to U.S. servicemen in South Vietnam on the 21st called the captures "a Christmas gift from Nixon." It said that while President Nixon was "raving about winding down the war and bringing captured U.S. pilots home," the four airmen were captured three years after President Johnson stopped the air war against the DRV. The broadcast concluded by noting that in Paris the PRG has made clear that all captured U.S. military men will be released if the President agrees to the withdrawal of all U.S. troops, but that the DRV has also stated its "right and resolve" to shoot down any U.S. plane that invades its airspace.

**VIGILANCE** The foreign ministry statement and other propaganda stress North Vietnamese vigilance in downing the planes over the weekend and call on the armed forces and people to further enhance their vigilance and combat-readiness. This theme was underscored in the VPA High Command communique reporting the incident, in a Hanoi radio commentary on the 18th, and in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN articles on the 19th. Another domestic service broadcast, on the 20th, detailed some of the steps taken in individual provinces to increase preparedness. NHAN DAN's article called specifically for correct implementation of the troop recruitment task, and the radio commentary of the 18th included preparations "to neatly annihilate all enemy commando groups" in a list of combat-readiness tasks.

---

\* In a departure from past practice, Hanoi media have not broadcast Christmas messages this year from U.S. prisoners in North Vietnam. Liberation Radio, however, has broadcast three messages from U.S. captives--one each on 18, 19, and 20 December. Unlike past holiday messages from the North, these emphasize opposition to the war.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

22 DECEMBER 1971

- 5 -

## HANOI AND PATHET LAO ACCLAIM "VICTORIES" ON PLAIN OF JARS

Hanoi has publicized Pathet Lao claims of successes in the offensive on the Plain of Jars which began on 18 December and has commented in broadcasts and in NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN articles on 22 December. The NHAN DAN article, broadcast by Hanoi in Vietnamese to the South, labels the offensive a "blitzkrieg" and cites claims that on the 18th and 19th the "Lao armed forces and people" annihilated nearly 1,000 troops and wiped out or inflicted heavy losses on one army corps headquarters and three battalions, including one Thai "mercenary" battalion. The paper also applauds the recapture of Muong Soui township and the alleged downing of seven U.S. planes in the course of the fighting. (A Pathet Lao news agency report on 22 December indicates that the offensive continued on the 20th. Detailing specific actions on that day, it claims that nearly 700 more soldiers were put out of action and that another U.S. plane was downed.)

Like Pathet Lao comment, the NHAN DAN article says the current attacks are punishment for encroachments on the Plain of Jars during the rainy season, and it adds that the Laotian "victories" "have frustrated the U.S. aggressors' and their lackeys' scheme to occupy the liberated areas on Laotian territory bordering the northern part of our country." DRV Defense Minister Giap, in his 18 December speech marking the anniversaries of Resistance Day and Army Day, laid even greater emphasis on the significance to the DRV of fighting in this area: Giap scored the United States for bringing "a big force of Thai troops into Laos to join the 'special forces' and the U.S.-commanded rightist army in launching nibbling attacks against the liberated zone and threatening North Vietnam."\*

---

\* While official DRV statements on the fighting in the Plain of Jars in recent months have not claimed that the DRV was threatened, this theme appeared in a 21 November statement by a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman protesting intensification of the U.S. air war in Laos. Endorsing a 10 November protest by the Lao Patriotic Front, the statement charged that the increased use of U.S. air power was part of a U.S. "scheme to intensify and widen the war in Laos and the other Indochinese countries," violate the 1962 Geneva agreements, and "directly threaten the security of the DRV."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 DECEMBER 1971

- 6 -

## SOUPHANOUVONG DECRIES U.S. OPERATIONS, DEMANDS BOMBING HALT

Another hard-line letter from Souphanouvong to Souvanna Phouma has been publicized following the start of the current communist offensive in the Plain of Jars. Dated 16 December and carried by the Pathet Lao News Agency on the 22d, the letter continues the correspondence between the two Laotian princes on the issue of a settlement in Laos. It answers Souvanna Phouma's message of 27 November, which had replied to a 20 November letter from Souphanouvong reiterating the NLHS demand for a U.S. bombing halt in Laos.\*

Souvanna Phouma's 27 November message had complained about Souphanouvong's silence, in his letter earlier that month, on the matter of North Vietnamese aggression in Laos. Souvanna had also repeated suggestions that Souphanouvong's special envoy Tiao Souk Vongsak be given authority to negotiate and that the Plain of Jars be neutralized. Ignoring the substance of Souvanna Phouma's letter, Souphanouvong's response merely describes it as a rehash of "old allegations" and "slanders" against the "patriots."

Predating the current communist offensive, Souphanouvong's letter includes a reference to the "seriousness" of U.S. moves to "step up" application of the Nixon Doctrine in Laos. At the start of the dry season, the letter says, the Americans mustered "tens of thousands" of Vientiane troops and Vang Pao forces and "dozens of battalions" of Thais who, supported by the U.S. air force and "under the command" of U.S. advisers, have launched "nibbling operations" particularly in southern Laos and the Plain of Jars. Souphanouvong says they also launched a "campaign of slander" against the NLHS and the DRV, but as usual he does not specify the nature of the slander.

Souphanouvong repeats the warning that the "Nixon clique" and their "henchmen" will have to bear "full responsibility" for the consequences of their acts and that Souvanna Phouma will have to share "a heavy part" of the responsibility. He concludes by stating again that the NLHS five points and the proposals of 26 April and 22 June are fair and reasonable and conform to the

---

\* Souphanouvong's 20 November letter reopened the nearly two-year-old correspondence between the two princes which had been interrupted last August. The November exchange is discussed in the 1 December TRENDS, pages 9-10.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

22 DECEMBER 1971

- 7 -

1962 Geneva agreements and the "realities of the present situation" in Laos. Once again, he demands that the United States stop its intervention and aggression in Laos, "first of all" halting totally and unconditionally the bombing on the "whole territory" of Laos, and let the Laotians settle their own affairs.

#### DRV, PRG CONTINUE TO SCORE U.S. SUSPENSION OF PARIS TALKS

Vietnamese communist criticism of Ambassador Porter's suggestion at the Paris talks on 9 December that the next session, the 139th, be postponed until the 23d\* has continued following his statement on the 15th proposing another postponement, until 30 December, "in order to afford the other side additional time for reflection and decision on their approach to these talks." Both the DRV and PRG delegations held press conferences in Paris on the 15th to condemn this "unreasonable" postponement.

VNA quotes DRV spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le as calling the postponements "an extremely insolent act" which shows that the U.S. delegation refuses to respond seriously to the PRG's seven-point initiative and that it has nothing to say "except shopworn allegations dating from 1969-70." PRG spokesman Ly Van Sau asserted in his statement that the PRG has for three years demonstrated its good will in negotiations, in contrast to U.S. Administration efforts to continue the war rather than negotiate seriously.

There is no available followup Hanoi radio or press comment on Porter's statement of the 15th. But on the 16th Hanoi media publicized a message from Xuan Thuy to the Third Congress of the Vietnam Fatherland Front, reporting on the Paris talks, which among other things scored U.S. postponement of the talks. Thuy's message had been transmitted from Paris to Hanoi on VNA's service channel on the 14th.

An LPA commentary--carried both by the news agency and by Liberation Radio--calls the "unilateral postponement" a "premediated ugly act" aimed at sabotaging the Paris talks. Like the 12 December NHAN DAN Commentator article, it recalls that in 1970 the Nixon Administration had "abstained from designating the U.S. chief negotiator" at Paris.

---

\* Communist reaction, including a 12 December NHAN DAN Commentator article, is discussed in the 15 December 1971 TRENDS, pages 9-11.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 DECEMBER 1971

- 8 -

Porter, it says, has "repeated the same roundabout and unreasonable argument" to avoid responding to the PRG seven-point proposal and continues to "stick to the old and cunning arguments of Nixon on the so-called 'cease-fire' and 'POW' problems in order to fool public opinion." The commentator complains that "in only seven days, the U.S. delegate twice tried to postpone the 139th session, thus prolonging the period between the two sessions from one week, as agreed upon, to three weeks."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 DECEMBER 1971

- 9 -

## HANOI OBSERVES ARMY DAY AND RESISTANCE DAY, URGES ENLISTMENTS

Hanoi media on the 18th report that a meeting was held that day to celebrate the 25th anniversary of Resistance Day (19 December) and the 27th anniversary of the DRV Army (VPA) (22 December).<sup>\*</sup> The meeting, sponsored by Vietnam Fatherland Front organizations and the Defense Ministry, was attended by Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Van Tien Dung, Hoang Quoc Viet, and Song Hoa. As has been the case in previous years, opening remarks were made by Pham Van Dong and Defense Minister Giap delivered the main address.

Giap, in standard fashion, stressed the international significance of the Vietnam war, charging that the United States was using Vietnam as a place to test methods of suppressing national liberation movements and to "threaten the socialist camp." He characterized the war as a confrontation between "the most revolutionary and the most reactionary forces of our time" and said that this was the reason for its "tremendous historical importance." Giap also gave credit to foreign assistance and support for their role in achieving "victories" in the war, routinely citing the Soviet Union and China specifically in this connection.

Giap scored the Nixon Doctrine as "a monstrous creature" born in conditions of U.S. "failure" in Vietnam. Condemning the Nixon Administration for "speaking of peace while frantically" continuing the war, Giap specifically decried "savage" U.S. air attacks "against our people everywhere" and the "intensification" of attacks against the North.<sup>\*\*</sup> U.S. support for the Saigon government, the "evil design" of the United States to occupy

---

<sup>\*</sup> This anniversary meeting has normally been held somewhat later--on 21 or 22 December. The celebration may have been held earlier to avoid conflicting with ceremonies on the 21 December arrival of a Bulgarian party-government delegation led by Politburo member and Council of Ministers Chairman Stanko Todorov. Last year's VPA and Resistance Day anniversaries were discussed in the 23 December TRENDS, pages 1-3.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Pham Van Dong at a 21 December banquet in honor of the visiting Bulgarian party-government delegation made what could have been a passing reference to the weekend air action. Declaring that the North Vietnamese are maintaining their vigilance, he said they are "determined to smash all piratical acts of encroachment" upon the DRV "as they did recently."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 DECEMBER 1971

- 10 -

South Vietnam "indefinitely," and the U.S. "rejection" of the PRG's seven points and "provocative acts to sabotage the Paris conference." Giap went on to state that the United States is "running here and there in an attempt to seek a way out of its fix, to seek a so-called position of strength." He maintained that such "perfidious maneuvers" are "mad illusions" but said "we are extremely vigilant in the face of all new enemy schemes and tricks."

Giap followed the standard line in evaluating the communists' military position, holding that the balance of forces is changing "in our favor and to the detriment of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen." Like other comment, Giap credited the Indochinese forces with having won "very big victories of strategic significance" this year. Discussing the growth of communist forces in South Vietnam he claimed, among other things, that "the regular army of the PLAF has grown by leaps and bounds in waging major annihilation battles with coordinated fighting between the various arms."

The 19 December QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on Resistance Day was notably frank in crediting North Vietnam for its part in achieving the communists' allegedly favorable position in the balance of forces. Stressing the "decisive" role of "a steady rearline," the editorial declared: "The socialist North is the inexhaustible source of strength that encourages and aids the front, making important contributions to changing the balance of forces and creating new steps of development in the anti-U.S. salvation resistance." The editorial was also outspoken in its claims about the weakness of Saigon's forces: Commenting that President Nixon's "biggest difficulty" is the problem of withdrawing forces while the war continues, it maintained that "the puppet army is in no position to withstand major attacks" and that the Saigon government is being weakened by "internal contradictions."

ENLISTMENT MEETING      On 19 December, Resistance Day, Giap was present at another meeting in Hanoi--to commemorate the December anniversaries and "the festive day of the Hanoi youths' voluntary enlistment in the army." Giap's presence lent unusually high-level prestige to what appears to be a part of Hanoi's continuing intensive campaign of recruitment. The mass meeting of rifle-carrying militiamen and young people, reported by Hanoi radio on the 21st, heard speeches by lower-level figures--including a youth who was, according to the radio,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 DECEMBER 1971

- 11 -

"soon to go to the frontline." Giap reportedly embraced the young soldier and then briefly addressed the gathering, praising youths throughout the country for "enthusiastically enlisting" and militiamen for their readiness and determination to frustrate all allied "schemes." He urged Hanoi youths to "develop the capital's tradition of courageously dying so that the fatherland may survive, to continuously improve their physical fitness, and to stand ready to fight to protect the fatherland's independence and freedom."

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 DECEMBER 1971

- 12 -

## MEETINGS IN SOUTH AND NORTH VIETNAM MARK NFLSV ANNIVERSARY

The 11th anniversary of the NFLSV was marked in South Vietnam at a "grand meeting" on 18 December, sponsored by the Front, the Vietnam Alliance, and the PRG and attended by the leaders of the three organizations. As was the case last year, NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho delivered the main address and Alliance Chairman Trinh Dinh Thao also spoke.\* The rarely mentioned People's Revolutionary Party was among the organizations Liberation Radio said were represented at the anniversary gathering.

As would be expected, Tho restated the two primary demands of the PRG's seven-point proposal, following the hardened formulation which has become standard since Pham Van Dong enunciated it in his 20 November speech in Peking. Tho also echoed the argument put forward in Dong's 20 November speech, but not pressed in propaganda since, that the two points are "closely interrelated."\*\* He maintained that "because through the Vietnamization plan the U.S. Government intends to gradually withdraw U.S. forces while continuing its war of aggression through the use of puppet forces under U.S. command and with strong U.S. support," if the war is to be ended the United States must withdraw all its troops "and stop using the Nguyen Van Thieu puppet administration as a lackey for implementing its aggressive policy."

Tho went on to deplore the absence of a U.S. response to the PRG's seven points and to charge that the United States has sought to "impede and sabotage" the Paris conference, continues its military presence in South Vietnam and its support for the Thieu regime, and has "threatened to intensify" the Indochina

---

\* Front accounts of the meeting differed from those last year in listing Alliance Chairman Trinh Dinh Thao second after Nguyen Huu Tho--ahead of PRG President Huynh Tan Phat, who was ranked second in the list of dignitaries last year. For a discussion of last year's meeting, see the 23 December TRENDS, page 8.

\*\* The only known repetition of this argument was in the speech by DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh at the 7 December session of the Sixth Polish United Workers Party Congress. Dong's 20 November speech is discussed in the TRENDS of 24 November, pages 5-8.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

22 DECEMBER 1971

- 13 -

war through the use of the U.S. air force. In an apparent allusion to President Nixon's 12 November press conference, Tho added that the President's "statement on 13 November 1971 has exposed this dark design more clearly."

Reaffirming the communists' policy of "national concord," Tho appealed to other elements in South Vietnam to help bring about the formation of a new Saigon administration to hold talks with the PRG. He maintained that "among the Vietnamese people, except for a handful of warlike and dictatorial people in the Thieu clique, everything can be discussed and settled on the basis of national concord, so that the war may be soon put to an end and peace be reestablished . . . ."

In his review of the communists' military position, Tho claimed that the Indochinese "peoples" have "won great victories of strategic significance," that the Vietnamization strategy has been "seriously shattered in its initial stage and certainly will be completely defeated," and that the Nixon Doctrine "has sustained a serious setback and surely will fail completely." Later Tho asserted that "bright prospects have been opened for us" and went on to declare that "the period ahead will be one of fierce struggle in which we have to overcome many hardships and sacrifices, but it will also be a period of great and all-round victories."

HANOI MEETING      Hanoi marked the Front anniversary at a 19 December meeting, sponsored by the Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF) organizations and the PRG special representation in Hanoi. Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi--the highest-level DRV leader present--delivered opening remarks at the gathering, and the main addresses were given by party Central Committee member and VFF functionary Hoang Quoc Viet and NFLSV representative Nguyen Van Ngoi. Viet has addressed the NFLSV anniversary meetings for the past two years, but higher-level Politburo figures than Le Thanh Nghi have appeared at these meetings.\* DRV President Ton Duc Thang sent his usual

---

\* The 10th anniversary meeting last year, not surprisingly, prompted appearances by Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, and Vo Nguyen Giap. But even the eighth anniversary in 1969 was attended by Truong Chinh, and in 1968 Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong were present.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 DECEMBER 1971

- 14 -

message to NFLSV Chairman Tho on the anniversary and reportedly also paid a visit to the PRG representation in Hanoi to personally convey his good wishes.

#### PEKING OBSERVES NFLSV ANNIVERSARY IN LOW KEY

The NFLSV's 11th anniversary received the kind of low-key attention from Peking that marked the last nondecennial anniversary in 1969. The customary leaders' message to Nguyen Huu Tho and Huynh Tan Phat was signed this year by Mao, Tung Pi-wu, and Chou En-lai--the new protocol trinity after Lin Piao's fall. A Peking reception was hosted by the China-Vietnam Friendship Association and the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries on the 19th, and a reception given by the PRG Ambassador the next day was attended by Keng Piao, head of the CCP International Liaison Department.

The Chinese leaders' message praised the struggle of the South Vietnamese "patriots" as an encouragement and example for all oppressed peoples and nations and lauded their victories on the "military, political, and diplomatic fronts." It asserted that the "U.S. aggressors" are in the grip of contradictions and crises and that the Nixon Doctrine and Vietnamization plan are going into "bankruptcy." And it expressed confidence that the Vietnamese people will realize their goals fighting in "unity" with the Lao and Cambodian people. But in keeping with practice over the past several months, the message omitted the reference to perseverance in "protracted people's war" which appeared in last year's message.\* The message concluded with the avowal that the Chinese people take it as their "bounden internationalist duty" to support the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples and with the pledge that they will continue to give "all-out support and assistance" until complete victory.

---

\* Chinese propaganda dropped calls for perseverance in protracted war in the wake of the Lam Son 719 operation in southern Laos last March and portrayed the Indochinese situation in confident terms as "unprecedentedly fine." The reference to protracted war was omitted from leaders' messages this year on Cambodian, DRV, and Laotian anniversaries. See the TRENDS of 10 November 1971, page 23.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 15 -

## MOSCOW GIVES FRONT ANNIVERSARY MODERATE ATTENTION

Moscow marked the NFLSV anniversary with the usual greetings message from Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin to Nguyen Huu Tho and Huynh Tan Phat, as well as with the customary "solidarity week" highlighted by a Moscow public meeting and other factory meetings. In a departure from the norm, however, there was no editorial comment on the occasion in the Soviet press.

The Moscow meeting, briefly reported on 20 December in the Moscow domestic service, was attended by CPSU Secretary Katushev, who also attended the meeting in 1969; inexplicably, there was no high Soviet official at the 10th anniversary meeting last year. Prior to 1969, before the main Front anniversary was shifted to the 6 June anniversary of the PRG, it had been pro forma for a CPSU Politburo member to attend the Moscow meeting each year.

The Soviet leaders' message promised continued "all-round support" from the USSR in conformity with "Leninist principles of internationalism." It supported the PRG's seven-point proposal as "a reasonable and fair basis for settling the Vietnam question," and it condemned "hypocritical" U.S. talk of scaling down the war while in fact continuing attempts to solve the problems of Indochina "by force of arms." If the United States really wants peace, the message said, it should end interference in the affairs of the peoples of Indochina, withdraw troops, "cease its flagrant encroachments on the sovereignty and security of the DRV," and give up attempts to impose on the South Vietnamese people "the odious and venal regime of its henchmen."

Routine Soviet comment on the anniversary included some broadcasts in Mandarin which called attention to Soviet assistance to the Vietnamese people and Vietnamese expressions of gratitude. A 20 December Mandarin broadcast over Radio Peace and Progress also included an attack on Peking's Indochina policies, reiterating charges that the Chinese leaders are in effect helping the United States in Indochina. Peking's rejection of "united action" with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in aiding the Indochinese peoples, said the commentary, resulted in an "immediate" expansion of the military action in the South and the start of the U.S. bombing of the North. Ever since then, the commentary continued, whenever China intensified its "anti-Soviet frenzy" the United States and its "mercenary troops"

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL .

FBIS TRENDS  
22 DECEMBER 1971

- 16 -

stepped up military action in Indochina; thus, the Chinese leaders "have openly moved, and are moving, closer to the U.S. ruling clique on the basis of anti-Sovietism." The commentary concluded that "the latest anti-Soviet campaign," seeking to brand the USSR as the enemy of the national liberation movement, is aimed in part at alienating the Vietnamese people from their "steady ally and friend."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

22 DECEMBER 1971

- 17 -

## INDIA - PAKISTAN

Beginning with a Chinese statement on 16 December, both Peking and Moscow offered their first formal government statements on the Indian-Pakistani conflict. Coming well after the fighting had intensified on 3 December, the statements from both sides were marked by restraint and moderation, with Moscow expressing confidence regarding a political settlement and Peking cautiously warning against an enlargement of the fighting. A PRC Government statement on the 16th was followed on the same day by diversionary pressure on India in the form of a foreign ministry protest against an alleged Indian encroachment along the PRC-Sikkim border. Two days later a Soviet Foreign Ministry statement looked toward a political settlement of the conflict and called on all countries to refrain from steps that could impede normalization of the situation.

## PEKING WARNS AGAINST EXPANDED CONFLICT IN WESTERN SECTOR

In effect shifting attention to the western theater of the conflict as Pakistani resistance was crumbling in the east, the 16 December PRC Government statement claimed that India's aim was not only "to swallow up East Pakistan" but also "to destroy Pakistan as a whole"--the first time Peking had attributed the broader intention to India. "If a timely stop is not put to such aggression," the statement warned, Pakistan "will not be the only country to fall victim. Inevitably other countries neighboring on India will also be endangered." In thus raising the question of Chinese security in the context of possible future developments in the west at a time when events in the east had all but run their course, the statement served as a warning to India not to press its advantage by seeking further gains.

Putting further pressure on the Indians, Peking also released a foreign ministry note on the 16th charging that seven Indian armed personnel on 10 December had intruded into China for reconnaissance across Sese La on the border between Tibet and India's Sikkim protectorate. Calling the alleged intrusion "a grave encroachment," the note lodged "a strong protest" and demanded that India "immediately stop its activities of intrusion." While serving a diversionary purpose, the belated protest was notably mild in comparison to similar protests at

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 DECEMBER 1971

- 18 -

the time of the 1965 Indian-Pakistani conflict. At that time Peking said it would strengthen its defenses in light of the border trouble and issued an ultimatum to India to dismantle installations along the border. Where Peking had issued a government statement one day after the eruption of major fighting in 1965, this time it waited until after the outcome of the fighting in East Pakistan was clear before releasing a government statement and raising the border issue. Another protest note, from the PRC embassy in New Delhi on the 18th and released on the next day, complained about an anti-Chinese demonstration outside the embassy on the 13th.

The government statement contained Peking's most explicit expression of support for Pakistan, vowing that the Chinese are not only supporting the Pakistanis politically but "will continue to give them material assistance." While thus suggesting a continuation of Chinese military aid, the statement went on to focus on the diplomatic arena in demanding immediate implementation of the 7 December UNGA ceasefire resolution and leveling an implicit attack on Britain and France for remaining "inactive and silent" at the United Nations.

KASHMIR In shifting attention to the west, Peking has raised the Kashmir question in the course of reminding India of what the government statement called "its own nationality problems, whose complexity and acuteness are rarely seen elsewhere in the world." On the same day as the government statement, which contrasted India's professed concern with self-determination in East Pakistan with its refusal to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir, an NCNA report recounted in detail the dispute over Kashmir and recalled the 1965 war as a case of "armed struggle" by the people in the Indian-held area.

While Chinese media have not detailed conquests of territory by either side along the western border--and have not referred to the 17 December cease-fire in that sector--Peking has attributed to India an intention "to annex the territory occupied by the Indian aggressor troops in West Pakistan." Charging Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi with hypocritically proclaiming that India has no territorial ambitions in East Pakistan, NCNA on the 19th quoted Indian Defense Minister Ram's demand that any Indian-Pakistani settlement must "guarantee to us a security of our borders and vital road communications." It cited a Western news agency as saying Ram's remarks indicate that the Indians will seek to hold territory they occupied in West

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

22 DECEMBER 1971

- 19 -

Pakistan, particularly around a town commanding the major road link to northern Kashmir. NCNA also quoted an Indian spokesman as saying the frontiers must be determined according to "the new ceasefire line" resulting from the fighting.

**BHUTTO ACCESSION** NCNA on the 21st followed a factual report that Yahya Khan had "handed over powers" to Ali Bhutto, who was "sworn in as president and chief martial law administrator," with highlights of Bhutto's nationwide broadcast and press conference on the 20th. Peking reported Bhutto's statement that Yahya Khan "had already retired voluntarily"--it did not provide further explanation or directly link the retirement to military defeat--and that six generals had been retired "honorably and gracefully" in "defense of the people's wish."

While quoting Bhutto's acknowledgment that Pakistan had "suffered a temporary military defeat," NCNA stressed the new leader's declaration that "East Pakistan is an inseparable and indissoluble part of Pakistan" and that "the military occupation" of that part of the country is "a temporary and not a lasting phenomenon." It noted his intention to talk with "the genuine leaders" of East Pakistan "to work out a new arrangement in terms of a loose confederation" within the concept of "one united Pakistan." Bhutto's terms for "a lasting settlement" between India and Pakistan, NCNA said, include "the maintenance of Pakistan as it came into being in 1947 and the solution of the Kashmir dispute." NCNA quoted Bhutto's avowal that he was "ready to open a new chapter in the relations with India." NCNA also took note of Bhutto's decision to nullify the recent by-elections in East Pakistan, thus reversing Yahya's move to erase the results of the December 1970 elections.

**SUPERPOWER POLITICS** Having witnessed a military defeat suffered by a close friend at the hands of a Soviet-supported adversary, Peking has sought to counter Moscow's geopolitical gains in South Asia by arousing concern within the international community over Soviet "social imperialism." Chou En-lai, speaking at a banquet for a visiting Sudanese delegation on the day after the PRC Government statement, delivered a scathing denunciation of Moscow's policies in both South Asia and the Middle East, thereby making a pitch for understanding within the Muslim world in areas of strategic significance. By coupling the South Asian and Middle East situations, Chou also sought to parry Moscow's polemical thrusts on the national liberation issue, a longtime subject of Sino-Soviet competition on which the Chinese have been on the defensive in the case of East Pakistan.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 DECEMBER 1971

- 20 -

Moving to the offensive, Chou argued that Moscow is trying to undermine the Arab armed struggle in the Middle East while flaunting support for national liberation in East Pakistan. Whatever Moscow's pretexts, Chou declared, its purpose in each situation is to expand its influence in order to "contend for hegemony" in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, on the one hand, and the South Asian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean on the other. According to East European but not Soviet sources, diplomats of the USSR and its allies as well as of Yugoslavia and India walked out in protest against Chou's harsh attack.

The line of Chou's argument was also developed in an NCNA article on the 20th deriding the Soviets for professing concern over the fate of the East Pakistani refugees while having "criminally sold out and sacrificed" the interests of the Palestinian refugees. After documenting Moscow's record of opposition to armed struggle in the Middle East, NCNA concluded that the Soviet aim in both South Asia and the Middle East is to attain global hegemony and to establish "a world empire which the old tsars had failed to realize."

The Middle East figured in a new twist given to Peking's geopolitical analysis of superpower rivalry in a 15 December speech by Huang Hua at the Security Council. Extending Peking's line on Moscow's purpose in backing India, Huang claimed that the Soviet Union sought to gain superiority in South Asia "as a flanking movement to affect the situation in the Middle East, to strengthen its position in its confrontation with the other superpower in the Middle East and other parts of the world, and to wage an even fiercer struggle for world hegemony with the other superpower." Though he attacked "the new tsars," Huang did not repeat the charge he made on the 6th that one of the Soviet aims is to encircle China.

In effect reflecting satisfaction over the alignment of Chinese and U.S. positions on the Indian-Pakistani conflict,\* Peking has used the euphemism "the other superpower" in referring to

---

\* NCNA's Rawalpindi correspondent, in a dispatch to the home office on the 20th, reported Bhutto's meetings that afternoon with various ambassadors. The report said the first to call on Bhutto was the U.S. ambassador, who was allotted 45 minutes, followed immediately by the Chinese ambassador for the same length of time. Next came the French and British envoys, each given a half hour, and the last to see Bhutto was the Soviet ambassador. "It could not be determined how long he stayed with the president," the dispatch concluded.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

22 DECEMBER 1971

- 21 -

Washington's rivalry with the Soviets in this area. Most notably, Chou in his speech on the 17th failed to refer to the United States at all in depicting Moscow's efforts to contend for hegemony. In contrast, the 20 December NCNA attack on Moscow's Middle East policies referred several times to the part played by "U.S. imperialism" in that region. Noting that the two super-powers "contend and collude at the same time" in the Middle East, NCNA portrayed a scramble for hegemony in order "to control this oil-rich area of important strategic significance."

#### MOSCOW WELCOMES MOVES TOWARD SETTLEMENT OF CONFLICT

The Soviet Foreign Ministry statement, released early on the 18th soon after Pakistan reciprocated India's ceasefire in both the west and the east, expressed satisfaction that a change toward "relaxation of the dangerous development of events" had taken place. The statement welcomed India's unilateral decision to cease fire along the western front and "on the 1965 ceasefire line in Kashmir," cited Prime Minister Gandhi's disclaimer of territorial claims as an "important Indian initiative confirming her peaceful intentions," and applauded Pakistan's decision to accept the ceasefire in the west. The statement called on all countries to assist in "the speediest restoration of peace" on the subcontinent and to "refrain from any steps that could impede the normalization of the situation."

In thus offering its first formal statement above the level of the 5 December TASS statement, Moscow moved swiftly after the ceasefire to use its authority in behalf of an early settlement and to restrain the ambitions of Indian hawks. Moscow has also displayed moderation in reacting to Peking's moves on the 16th. Apart from reporting India's rejection of the Chinese charge of a border intrusion, Moscow's response to the PRC Government statement and the protest note has been concentrated in broadcasts to the Chinese claiming that Peking's moves were designed to divert the people's attention from the domestic political situation.

BANGLA DESH  
RECOGNITION

The Soviet Foreign Ministry note called for transfer of power to "the legally elected representatives of the East Pakistan people" and said "the necessary conditions are now taking shape for the complete elimination of the armed conflict" on the subcontinent and for "an effective political settlement" of the problems

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 DECEMBER 1971

- 22 -

involved. Though the statement thus avoided anticipating the status of East Bengal, increasing references to "Bangla Desh" in Soviet and East European commentary suggest movement toward eventual recognition of a Bangla Desh regime.

The East Europeans have moved ahead of Moscow in this regard, as in the East Berlin radio's reference on the 15th to "what was then East Pakistan and now Bangla Desh." A GDR National Front statement and a BERLINER ZEITUNG commentary, both on 16 December, cited "Bangla Desh" rather than "East Pakistan." On 21 December the Polish news agency reported that the Pakistani ambassador to Poland had expressed his wish to represent the Bangla Desh Government and said he would seek Polish recognition for Bangla Desh.

TASS has been relaying reports concerning restored civil administration in East Pakistan. A dispatch on the 17th, citing an Indian spokesman, said representatives of "the Bangla Desh civil administration arrived today in Dacca to assume complete control" and reported that the "government of Bangla Desh has started functioning." Sidestepping the issue of recognition, however, the TASS account of Mrs. Gandhi's interview with a British paper on 18 December did not mention her denial that the issue had been discussed with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov during his extended visit which ended on the 17th.

#### NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT

Moscow has eagerly exploited the East Pakistan problem to challenge Peking's credentials as a leader of the national liberation movement and to denigrate Peking's role in the third world. In comment broadcast to the Chinese, Moscow has linked the PRC Government statement and protest note of the 16th to the arrival of vessels of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Bay of Bengal, developing the theme of a Sino-U.S. "plot" against the national liberation movement.

A convergence of Chinese and U.S. positions on the Indian-Pakistani conflict is a major theme in a sharp attack in PRAVDA on the Peking leaders as "traitors to the national liberation movement who are objectively helping imperialism." In an article on the 22d, senior commentator V. Mayevskiy, whose article on the 9th led a torrent of Soviet press attacks on Peking, claimed that it is "with growing clarity that the peoples of the third world see the wide gap between the 'revolutionary' statements by the Peking leaders and their reactionary deeds." Arguing that Peking urged the United States to intervene in the South Asian conflict, Mayevskiy asserted categorically that Peking's position was one of the factors that brought the Seventh Fleet into the Indian Ocean.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

22 DECEMBER 1971

- 23 -

Like Peking, Mayevskiy compared the South Asian and Middle East situations in order to play up contradictions in the other side's policies. Thus Mayevskiy contrasted Peking's position on the former question, where it called for a ceasefire, and its alleged effort in the Middle East to push the Arabs into war. In both cases, according to Mayevskiy, "the Maoists played into the hands of imperialism" by fomenting conflicts between young independent states and undermining the forces of national liberation.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 DECEMBER 1971

- 24 -

## CHINA

### PRESS INDICATES FURTHER CHANGES ON CULTURAL FRONT

By linking the creation of new literary and art works to the forthcoming 30th anniversary of Mao's May 1942 Yanan Talks on Literature and Art, Peking has intensified a campaign begun earlier this year for new activity on the cultural front. The earlier stage of the campaign saw appeals for more and better reading materials last spring and led to approval for several new revolutionary operas which were unveiled on National Day in October. Current appeals to create new works, highlighted by a PEOPLE'S DAILY commentary on 16 December, stress many of the themes brought to prominence during the cultural revolution, but there are some modifications, presumably resulting from the purge of Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta.

The PEOPLE'S DAILY commentary and other recent articles do not mention the literary role of Chiang Ching, although she continues to appear in public ranked after Chou En-lai. Chiang's role as cultural czar was closely identified with Lin Piao, who appointed her overseer of culture in the PLA in February 1966. Chiang may have been removed from direct control of the cultural scene by the formation of a cultural group under the State Council last August.

PEOPLE'S DAILY indicates that the tight controls over literary works imposed during the cultural revolution have been somewhat modified and that amateurs and professionals alike must now create new works in the spirit of "letting a hundred flowers bloom." In pleading that artistic standards be raised, the commentary takes special pains to point out that "describing production processes and technical details" does not suffice for revolutionary drama. While the absorption of traditional and foreign literary forms was accepted throughout the cultural revolution, their use was severely limited. The commentary seems to convey some loosening of restrictions in noting that "everything useful in the legacy of ancient and foreign literature and art should be absorbed critically so that it can serve the creation of revolutionary literature and art."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 DECEMBER 1971

- 25 -

Cultural revolution injunctions that the workers and peasants should control the arts are also modified by the commentary. It calls on worker-peasant-soldier literary groups to carry out activities only "in their spare time," while the "old literary and art contingent must be rebuilt according to the party's policy on intellectuals." Since the party's policy is to make use of intellectuals even while they are still in the process of reformation, this appeal to reform the "old contingent," placed alongside the injunctions to improve quality, seems to constitute a considerable reversion to precultural revolution practice.

While the article follows traditional Maoist lines in calling for the creation of "heroic models of the proletariat," it fails to emphasize the need for a dominant hero--a major theme of cultural revolution literary criticism. Recent attacks on "heroes" and "saviors," as discussed in last week's TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA, have apparently caused some modification of this requirement.

#### PROPAGANDISTS REASSERT PARTY'S LEADERSHIP OVER ALL ORGANS

The propaganda campaign against the still-anonymous "swindlers" continues to mount, with particular emphasis on the need to strengthen party authority over all aspects of society in order to repair the damage caused by the conspirators. There are calls for determined struggle against evil persons who may have reached high positions; just as during the cultural revolution, however, it is stressed that the great majority of those who have erred are redeemable. The vague charges of a conspiracy to undermine party control of the PLA are often linked to injunctions to restudy the Kutien Conference Resolution of 1929. The militia, the revolutionary committees, and the mass organizations are all enjoined to obey the party in everything.

INTERPARTY STRUGGLES      An article by the writing group of the Shantung Provincial CCP Committee, published in RED FLAG No. 13 (released 4 December), sought to negate the mistaken idea held by some cadres that "the party has been purified and that the struggle between the two lines does not exist." Criticizing those who think that "there will be no more bad elements in the party," the article argued that "'purity' is only relative while 'impurity' is absolute," and asserted that there is "still dust in the house even though we clean it 24 hours a day."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 DECEMBER 1971

- 26 -

The article attempted to explain why class enemies "such as Liu Shao-chi" were unsatisfied despite their "high positions" and "great authority." Arguing that the "higher and greater their positions and authority, the bigger their ambitions will be," the article emphasized that the ambitions of "Liu Shao-chi and his ilk . . . can never be satisfied"; such people are doomed to perpetual struggle because their "criminal plots" can never succeed "so long as Chairman Mao's proletarian line and policy exist."

While the article called for completely smashing all such "criminal conspiracies," it drew a careful distinction between "chieftains of the revisionist line and good people who have made mistakes in regard to line." Indicating that a massive party purge is not now desired, the article asserted that "except for those who firmly refuse to correct their mistakes or fail to correct them despite repeated efforts to educate them, all cadres who have made mistakes, including those who have made serious mistakes, should be reunited and educated." Similar statements were, of course, made during the cultural revolution.

The immediate threat posed to party unity by "new bourgeois elements" within the upper reaches of the party itself was the thesis of a 13 December Harbin radio article. It warned of "class enemies" who try to "sneak into the inner party" where they "hide in ambush for a long time, awaiting the right opportunity to take action." Arguing for greater vigilance against this threat, the article asserted that "these people may be in very high positions" and able to use the "power they have usurped to push their counter-revolutionary revisionist line in the party." It was confidently predicted, however, that "no matter how beautifully they may be veiled" or "whatever high position the careerists or schemers may hold, and no matter how famous they are," they will finally "fall and perish by themselves as soon as their antiparty . . . plot is thoroughly exposed."

PARTY AND PLA      Radio reports exposing the attempt to undermine party control of the PLA from the "left"--seemingly a direct thrust at Lin Piao--are appearing with increasing frequency. Many of these reports have been linked with the injunction to intensify study of the resolution adopted at the Kutien Conference in December 1929 when Mao laid down a program of political training to bolster discipline within the PLA. Media calls for study of the Kutien Resolution

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 DECEMBER 1971

- 27 -

began gaining momentum only after the second party plenum in the fall of 1970; at that time they were linked to calls to study the Lin-inspired 1960 resolution to strengthen political study in the PLA. While this year's 42d anniversary of the publication of the Kutien Resolution is receiving widespread provincial attention, the 40th anniversary of the resolution was marked by only a few low-level radio reports.

Harbin radio on 11 December broadcast a detailed report on a forum held by the party committee of the Heilungkiang Military District for military cadres at the divisional and regimental level to celebrate the 42d anniversary of the Kutien Resolution. The forum called for further study of the Kutien Resolution to aid in ridding the PLA of the influence of "conspirators, renegades, and traitors" who attempted to destroy the nature of the people's army." It was specifically indicated that the current struggle between the proletarian line on army building and the bourgeois line on army building "focuses on whether party leadership is needed and whether the party commands the gun or the gun commands the party."

Following a reference to Lo Jui-ching's attempts to undermine Mao's line on army building from the "right," the article launched into a detailed condemnation of attempts to negate this line from the "extreme left." It was specified that the "swindlers" regarded "politics and military affairs as opposed to each other, and emphasized politics to the exclusion of line." Pointing to an intensified study of the Kutien Resolution as a "guarantee for correctly implementing Chairman Mao's line on army building," the article called for struggle against "chieftains of the opportunist line who want to oppose the party and usurp power."

A similar article, broadcast by Kunming radio on 13 December, called for further study of the Kutien Resolution in order to overcome the influence of "political swindlers such as Liu Shao-chi" who promoted the "erroneous idea of setting military affairs against political work." Revealing continuing sensitivity to the PLA's involvement in local administrative work, a carryover of tasks entrusted to the PLA during the cultural revolution, the article condemned "political swindlers such as Liu Shao-chi who appeared with ultra-leftist features and replaced military affairs with politics."

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 DECEMBER 1971

- 28 -

**MILITIA** Recent commentaries have also called for strengthening party leadership over militia units. A Sian broadcast on 11 December, for example, reported on the efforts of a county armed forces department to strengthen its party concept and "enthusiastically obey the unified leadership of the county CCP committee." The report told of the ideological progress made by the "support-the-left" personnel who were elected to leading positions on the new county party committee when it was first established. It was claimed that such personnel now realize that while the "PLA is the cornerstone of the dictatorship of the proletariat . . . full play can be given to the role of the cornerstone only under the leadership of the party."

**REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES** Although the leading role of local party committees over revolutionary committees has often been affirmed, the issue still appears to be subject to misunderstandings. Sian radio on 12 December said that after creation of a new party committee for a local mill "the mill CCP and revolutionary committees were functioning on an equal footing, thus weakening party leadership." Worried by this "unhealthy development," members of the mill CCP committee carried out education in strengthening the party concept until everyone understood "the correct relationship between the party and the individual" and the need to "resolutely implement the party's resolutions."

A similar commentary, broadcast by She. vang radio on 6 December, reported on efforts of leading members of a local plant revolutionary committee to "play their role fully under the party committee's centralized and unified leadership." To achieve this objective, the party committee within the plant organized leading members of the revolutionary committee to read books by "Marx, Lenin and Chairman Mao," which helped them "understand that the party is the supreme form of proletarian organization and should exercise leadership in everything."

**MASS ORGANIZATION** The crux of much of the current criticism of the "swindlers" is that they tried to turn the party itself into just another mass organization. Though Lin is probably not guilty of this charge--he was the only top political figure to mention publicly the party's important future role during the height of Red Guard activity in 1966--the charge may be applicable to such "leftists" as Chen Po-ta, whose power base was in the mass organizations.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 DECEMBER 1971

- 29 -

A Shanghai broadcast on 4 December made the most open attack so far on this type of deviation with the charge that the swindlers promoted the fallacy that "the worker-peasant organization is the organization of the communist party." According to the broadcast some new cadres were seriously confused by this concept, and now they are again confused by the emphasis on party control, which has led to a notion that "after the establishment of the party organization the mass organizations have nothing to do." The broadcast states that the correct role for the mass organizations is as "assistants to the party committees," with the mass organizations carrying out tasks in their own spheres in accord with party policies.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

22 DECEMBER 1971

- 30 -

## P R C - J A P A N

## NON-NEGOTIABLE POLITICAL ISSUES DIVIDE PEKING AND TOKYO

A joint communique issued on 21 December by representatives of the China-Japan Memorandum Trade Office of China and its counterpart in Japan, on political matters related to trade between the two countries for 1972, appears to have ruled out the possibility that the issues dividing China and Japan could be discussed within the process of normalization talks. Hopes that such a possibility might materialize were recently expressed by some Japanese Government leaders.

Both sides agreed that no amelioration of relations between the two countries is possible until the Japanese Government agrees--prior to negotiations--that "Taiwan province in an inalienable part of the sacred territory of the PRC" and that the 1952 Japan-Nationalist China treaty will be abrogated. This requirement was not contained in the trade communique signed last March nor in the other recently issued joint statements, such as the Komeito communique of 2 July and the 2 October communique with the Dietmen's League for Promoting the Restoration of Japan-China Diplomatic Relations. In line with the Dietmen's communique, however, the current statement does not cite U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan and the Taiwan straits area as one of the major issues preventing improvement of relations between China and Japan; this proviso was contained in the July Komeito communique.

The Japanese side specifically castigated the Sato Government for clinging "to the theory that the 'status of Taiwan remains to be determined'" and for intensifying "its plan for 'an independent Taiwan,' which is in effect continuing to create 'two Chinas.'" It also termed the "so-called 'Japan-Chiang treaty' . . . utterly illegal and invalid" and called for its abrogation. The Chinese side reiterated its claim that Taiwan had been returned to China in 1945 and said the argument that the "'status of Taiwan remains to be determined'" is an "utterly preposterous fallacy." Both sides then expressed their "unanimous" agreement that "the above-mentioned political principles" are "unshakable" and by "no means questions to be settled through negotiations."

During the trade talks in Peking from 4 to 21 December, the Japanese representatives "met and had a friendly conversation" with Chou En-lai, Li Hsien-nien, Kuo Mo-jo, and Wang Kuo-chuan, vice president of the China-Japan Friendship Association.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 31 -

## YUGOSLAVIA

### TITO INVOKES FOREIGN THREAT TO DEFEND MOVES AGAINST CROATS

Addressing the Yugoslav Trade Union Federation on 18 December, Tito defensively raised the specter of civil war and foreign intervention to justify his continuing crackdown on nationalist elements. He called upon the workers to join his campaign against nationalism and chauvinism, according to TANJUG, and told them that if he had not started the struggle "a shooting civil war perhaps would have begun in six months." Clearly alluding to the Soviets and the Brezhnev doctrine, the Yugoslav leader added: "And you know what that would have meant . . . . I could not have allowed someone else to come and restore peace and order." He added cryptically: "I would rather apply extreme means, and you know what extreme means these are."

Tito has played the theme of concern over an alleged external threat during past periods of internal tension when he has sought to promote national unity.\* His language now also conveys a threat--and establishes a rationale--for the possible use of the Yugoslav army to suppress further disorders should they arise. He elaborated on what he meant by "extreme means" in a toast at a dinner on the 21st. As quoted by TANJUG, he said "we have enough means and opportunities to solve our own internal questions ourselves" and added: "The task of our army is not merely to defend the territorial integrity of our country; its task is also to defend our socialism when we see that it is in danger and cannot be defended by other means."

In the 18 December speech, answering unnamed critics who say that the party should have taken action sooner against nationalist

---

\* In a different context and for a different audience, in his foreign policy report to the Federal Assembly only three days earlier, Tito had taken a sanguine view of the prospects for Soviet-Yugoslav relations, warmly hailing their development as attested to by Brezhnev's recent visit and projecting "a significant possibility of widening and enriching Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation." A TASS report of that speech in PRAVDA on the 18th, headlined "Favorable Prospects," said Tito "stressed the favorable development of Soviet-Yugoslav relations."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

22 DECEMBER 1971

- 32 -

manifestations, Tito defended his belated showdown with the Croatian party leadership and revealingly indicated that he had harbored doubts about the federal party's ability to act: "I realized," he said, that the struggle against nationalism "was a question of either/or, that we must act, although I was a little afraid because I saw that the League of Communists as a whole was not organized; I doubted that it could put up such a stand, as it later actually did at the LCY Presidium" which generated the crackdown on the Croatian nationalists.

Combining his hard line against nationalist elements with gestures of conciliation toward the youth, Tito went on to say that 90 percent of the Zagreb students who went on strike in late November are "honest young people" and "were led astray." In his first public comment on the Zagreb disorders that broke out in the wake of his purge of Croatian party leaders and the arrest of numerous students, he said that the demonstrators did not represent "the masses" and added vaguely that many of them were brought in from the outside and were not students at all. Remarking that "luckily, no shot was fired in those demonstrations," he went on to discount reports in the Western press about police brutality.

In a further effort to defuse the crisis, Tito criticized the Federal Executive Council for its "slowness" in dealing with economic problems and specifically demanded that the foreign exchange problem be solved as soon as possible. It was this issue that had triggered the Zagreb student strike, which was designed to put pressure on the Federal Government to settle the problem of Croatia's foreign exchange earnings in an acceptable fashion.

There have been no further reports of disorders in Zagreb since 15 December, but the media on the 17th and 18th publicized warnings against "subversive" activity in Croatia that was hostile to socialism. Radio Zagreb reported on the 18th that groups of "diversionists are still trying to create disorders and unrest in our city." And on the 17th TANJUG quoted newly appointed Croatian Executive Committee Secretary Vrhovec as calling on a group of workers to help prevent "provocations." According to this report, Vrhovec remarked that "again last night" agitators were distributing leaflets in certain parts of Zagreb. On the 21st, TANJUG reported that security police raided a Zagreb student hostel and "detained" 352 people. The report added that leaflets and newspapers of a "hostile content" were discovered and six firearms seized.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 33 -

That the effect of Tito's crackdown on the students has been to alienate them still further seemed indicated in a TANJUG report that the Presidium of the Croatian Youth Federation resigned en masse at a meeting on the 18th rather than discuss "the tasks of Croatia's youth in light of Tito's assessments." The media also continue to report resignations of municipal-level party officials in Croatia as well as various demands for expulsions from the party.

TANJUG reports that the LCY Presidium met again on the 20th to make plans for the second LCY conference, which will deal chiefly with League reorganization and economic issues. The conference was set for 25-26 January.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

22 DECEMBER 1971

- 34 -

## FRG - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

## PRAGUE FURTHER SOFTENS PUBLIC STANCE ON MUNICH ISSUE

The Czechoslovak Government's new program statement, read by Premier Strougal to the Federal Assembly on 17 December and carried by CTK, reflects an apparent further public softening of Prague's bargaining position in its exploratory talks with Bonn on normalizing relations. In the first high-level Czechoslovak discussion of the bilateral talks since the fourth round, held in Rothenburg ob der Tauber on 18 and 19 November, the statement continues what has appeared to be a process of watering down Prague's prior explicit, unequivocal insistence that the FRG join Czechoslovakia in recognizing the 1938 Munich agreement as invalid ab initio. It declares that in the talks with the FRG "we proceed from the standpoint that the Munich diktat was unjust and invalid from the beginning. We are striving to insure that this fact finds expression in the anticipated treaty between our two states."

The first sentence in this formula is in tune with language introduced by party Presidium member Bilak in a speech on 11 November: Bilak stated that "no Czechoslovak Government can ever recognize even the temporary validity of the Munich agreement," implying by this unilateral statement that the way might be open for a compromise in which Bonn would not be required to associate itself directly and explicitly with the position that the agreement was invalid during the period from September 1938 to March 1939, when Hitler's armies occupied Bohemia and Moravia.\* The added statement now that Czechoslovakia is striving simply to insure that its view "finds expression" in a treaty is the vaguest formulation yet to come from Prague. The phrase "we are striving to insure" may reflect continued bargaining over the language of the new "draft formulation" which Western press reports say was presented by the FRG at the fourth round of the talks, defining the limit to which Bonn was prepared to go on the Munich issue.

Notably absent from the program statement is the usual denunciatory language with respect to the "crime" perpetrated by Germany

---

\* See the TRENDS of 17 November 1971, pages 34-36, for a discussion of the Bilak speech. The fourth round of the talks is discussed in the issue of 1 December, pages 28-30.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS  
22 DECEMBER 1971

- 35 -

against Czechoslovakia via Munich. The tenor of the statement is optimistic, avowing Prague's wish to contribute to the present improvement of the political atmosphere in Europe and calling the "exchange of views" with Bonn a part of this contribution. The remarks on Prague's relations with West European countries in general are prefaced by the observation that it is in Czechoslovakia's interests to make an "active contribution" to realization of the USSR's "peace program"--a strong suggestion that Czechoslovakia is determined not to be left behind in the newly developing East-West European relations, particularly as regards any trade and economic advantages that may accrue from Bonn's Ostpolitik.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 DECEMBER 1971

- 36 -

## SALT

### FIRST SOVIET ARTICLE ON CURRENT ROUND REHASHES STOCK THEMES

An article in the foreign-language weekly MOSCOW NEWS contains Moscow's first full-length commentary devoted to the current sixth round of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) since their opening in Vienna on 15 November. Prior to the appearance of this article, less than a week before the holiday break in the Vienna negotiations, Soviet media had treated the talks only in passing--in terse reportage on the proceedings and in commentaries dealing with the spectrum of standing disarmament issues.

Written by Candidate of Science Igor Glagolev and reviewed by TASS on 16 December, the article adds nothing of note to the previously stated Soviet position. In routine fashion, it hails the 30 September accords between the United States and the USSR on improving the means of preventing accidental or unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons and improving the Washington-Moscow hotline; and it expresses hope for the success of the talks, whose tasks were "clearly defined" by the U.S.-Soviet agreement of 20 May.

At the same time, Glagolev takes note of the "negative stand" of the "military-industrial complex" and points to efforts by the United States to strengthen its military capabilities, citing among other things the creation of an ABM system. These actions, the author says, "naturally do not enhance the limitation of strategic armaments and the possibility of achieving international detente." In the same vein, an article in RED STAR on 18 December--without explicitly mentioning SALT--says U.S. commentators fear that White House approval of Pentagon plans for new weaponry is fraught with "the risk of upsetting the disarmament talks and frustrating chances for the establishment of stable peace."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 DECEMBER 1971

- 37 -

## USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

## ESTONIAN QUESTIONS BREZHNEV'S LIVESTOCK COMPLEX PROGRAM

A costly program to construct large livestock-raising complexes, as favored by Brezhnev, is well under way in the USSR. Notwithstanding this fact, the efficacy of the program has again been publicly questioned by E. Tynurist, first deputy premier of the Estonian Republic. Previously, in a 10 April 1970 IZVESTIYA article--shortly before Brezhnev's agricultural proposals were approved by the Politburo in May 1970--Tynurist had complained that the USSR Agriculture Ministry, instead of promoting advanced techniques, "is trying to reduce everything to reviewing purchase prices and increasing capital investments in the construction of large complexes."

Now, in a 16 December 1971 PRAVDA article, Tynurist argues that the key lies in more efficient techniques, not in new, costly livestock complexes, and this time he cites a computer study to support his position. He complains that farm leaders themselves often "do not see the main reason why a farm lags behind, or else they consider a less important, secondary matter as the main reason." He adds that "some people, for example, are inclined to overrate the role of building big livestock farms," and "some, not penetrating to the heart of the matter and not seeing the true causes for a lag in production, insistently demand from higher organs the wide development of construction of expensive livestock facilities." And yet--he goes on--modern mechanized barns do not guarantee higher labor productivity, while "practice shows that with skilled organization of production and creation of a solid fodder base one can get good results even on the present livestock raising farms."

Brezhnev and Polyanskiy have repeatedly stressed the primacy of greatly expanding agriculture's material-technical base; although Tynurist's criticisms are ostensibly aimed at local farm leaders, they implicitly apply to Brezhnev and Polyanskiy as well.

In his article, entitled "Relying on Electronics," Tynurist argues that computers can enable farmers to identify the real reasons for lagging behind. He claims that Estonia's introduction of an automated system for processing data from all livestock farms made it possible "to reveal the true reasons" for the high cost of livestock products. These he identifies as the high cost of fodder and, in some kolkhozes, excessively high wages.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
22 DECEMBER 1971

- 38 -

Like Voronov, the former RSFSR premier, the Estonian leaders have almost openly criticized the solutions to the 1969-1970 meat shortage proposed by Brezhnev and Polyanskiy (big livestock complexes and higher prices for livestock products), complaining of their high cost and advocating instead more efficient methods and organization. At the December 1969 USSR Supreme Soviet session, Estonian Premier V. I. Klauson directly attacked the proposal to raise livestock procurement prices (SOVIET ESTONIA, 20 December 1969), while in November 1970 Voronov stated flatly that "no raising of prices" will help inefficient farms make livestock raising profitable (SOVIET RUSSIA, 25 November 1970).

The program to build many large livestock complexes was included in Brezhnev's spring 1970 agricultural proposals, along with the price rises, and was approved by the July 1970 Central Committee plenum. Expenditure of five billion rubles for the livestock complex program was the estimate of P. A. Yesaulov, deputy chief of Gosplan's agriculture department, in the December 1970 QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS.

Even these plans apparently turned out to be insufficient, and at the first Politburo meeting after the 24th congress Brezhnev (according to Komsomol First Secretary Ye. M. Tyazhelnikov in the 7 July SOVIET KIRGIZIA) proposed additional measures to aid livestock raising. The result was a 16 April 1971 Central Committee-Council of Ministers decree announcing a program to build 1,170 big livestock complexes and 585 poultry factories over the next three years. The cost of the program also rose. P. Poletayev in the July 1971 QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS spoke of a nine-billion-ruble program to build "highly mechanized livestock-raising facilities."

The plan for livestock complexes has become the most distinctive feature of the new agricultural program and, characteristically, has turned into a full-scale campaign--with the usual excesses. P. Chervenko, director of the Central Institute of Mechanization and Electrification of Livestock Raising, complained in the 19 May RURAL LIFE that some officials mistakenly believe that the large complexes are intended to be virtually the sole form of livestock raising, and he criticized a January ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE editorial for declaring that industrial complexes are now the "main direction in which we must conduct organizational work on all levels, in all echelons, in every kolkhoz and sovkhoz." "Reading such recommendations," says Chervenko, "everyone is striving to create 'complexes,' with local organizations ordering farms to build 'just a complex and nothing else.'"